this, the passages in his work which address this question are sufficiently consistent to bear witness to his interest. To deny this element of Lacan's thought is to distort the perspective of his work, its true stakes. And yet his "official" students maintain this denial, this blind spot. For them, the Jewish question is not significant within the context of Lacanian studies. My own study, a preliminary one, will attempt at least to show that the question should be asked. It will include bits of personal testimony with little claim to academic worth. In a strange and unfortunately anomaly, the study of Jacques Lacan's biography is difficult. In France, a country fond of biographies-each year numerous volumes on the personalities who have left their mark on French intellectual life appear-to this day none has been written about Lacan. His life remains shrouded in mystery, a result of the family's veto. The unbelievable atmosphere of clandestine conflicts, cabals, and power struggles, which today still divide the Lacanians, merely reinforces this veto.
Lacan was born in 1901 to a Catholic family. His brother was a monk, and he received a solid religious upbringing himself. His familiarity with the writings of Saint Augustine, Saint Tomas Aquinas, and the great mystics (Saint Theresa of Avila, Saint John of the Cross, Master Eckhart) attests to this fact. It seems from certain bits of evidence that in the thirties, the same period which he had his decisive encounter with psychoanalysis, Lacan also discovered Judaism in the course of a true spiritual crisis. How did this encounter occur? Apparently, it was the result of his reading Ϊsrael et l'humanité by Elie Benamozegh, published at the very beginning of the century, thanks to the devotion of Aimé Palliere, a defrocked Catholic seminarian who became so attached to Judaism that he almost converted. 2 Lacan seems throughout his life to have been profoundly influenced by this book of Kabbalistic inspiration, written in a fine philosophical prose. He drew from it some of his own formulations. What proof can we offer to support such a statement? There are two testimonials, one public, the other private. On certain Fridays, Lacan would stage at the Hôpital Psychiatrique de Sainte-Anne what he called his "presentation of patients." After an in-depth dialogue with a hospitalized individual which might last more than an hour, he would offer a few thoughts to the audience which he allowed to attend those sessions. Several of those presentations left a lasting impression on the participants 3 . Thus, in 1974, a young man about thirty years old was admitted for examination. His parents, both Jewish, had met in a concentration camp after it had been liberated by an allied army before they returned to France .They came to love each other under tragic conditions, and exchanged the strange vow that they would never tell their children of their Jewish background. Because of it they had suffered too much and so wished to break the chain of suffering. Thirty years later, their son, who had been conceived in the camp, was presented to Lacan. He had fallen prey to a "mystical"delusion centered specifically on this Judaism. Lacan, in the ensuing exchange, made two very important remarks. After escorting his patient out of the room, he returned, clearly moved, and repeated several times, "He read it! He read it!" What had this patient read? Benamozegh's book! Lacan, then more than 70 years old, voiced the high regard he had for this work, which, according to him, was "the best introduction to the Kabbalah," and invited his audience to read it. Moreover, in regard to the parents' oath never to acknowledge or transmit their There is not a single seminar by Lacan which does not contain more or less consistent explorations of Judaism, Freud's Jewish identity, and the history of the Jewish people. The texts which deal with the principal notions of Lacanian doctrine, the "object 'a'" and the Nom-du-Pere, are obviously very significant. First, the "object 'a'": toward the end of his life, I heard Lacan publicly and humbly acknowledge never having added anything to Freud's thought, with the possible exception of his elaboration of the "object 'a.'" Lacan developed this concept from Freudian theories of the "lost object," then still called a "drive-object" [objet pulsionnel] or "part-object" [objet partiel]. 6 Freud had recognized the existence of two part-objects and suspected that of a third. The two fundamental lost objects were the maternal teat and the fecal stuff. Through the study of voyeuro-exhibitionist perversion, Freud sensed, but without clearly articulating it, the existence of a third drive, which Lacan later called the scopic drive [pulsion scopique], in which the role of the lost object harks back to the gaze of the Other.7 This step took on considerable importance, for this object, unlike the two previous ones, derives from no biological function, either nursing or excremental. Psychoanalysis thus found itself stripped of its pseudobiological or medical straightjacket by which certain of its practitioners, indeed some of the most eminent, had sought to restrain it. In other words, psychoanalysis, by introducing the object of the gaze, reveals that it has no link whatsoever with the natural sciences. It establishes itself firmly on the side of culture, that is, within human specificity. Lacan goes even further by proposing a fourth driveobject which Freud almost never mentions, despite the importance of this object in psychotic hallucinations: the voice. With this notion of an invocative drive [pulsion invoquante], Lacan completes the catalogue of drives and their objects which, according to him, are four in number. Thus within the parenthesis which encompasses the breast, the feces, the gaze, and the voice, the "object 'a'"-the cause of desire-is constituted. Let us turn to the 1963 seminar on l'Angoisse, the very moment in Lacan's teaching at which this concept emerges. 8 One discovers that it is precisely in a moment of reflection on Judaism that Lacan produced his "object 'a.' " First he discusses circumcision and critiques the accepted interpretation of an equivalency between it and castration. In a reference to Nunberg, Lacan holds that the foreskin represents a female equivalent from which the male subject distances himself and that its removal is equivalent from which the male subject distances himself and that its removal is equivalent to the fall of the "object 'a. The "Proposition" exists in two different versions, which present important differences of formulation. These differences clarify the place of Judaism in Lacanian doctrine. We know that Lacan's teaching, from beginning to end, is based on the distinction-often repeated, even harped on-between three categories 11 . the Imaginary, an extension of the visual image of the body; the Symbolic (of language or of the signifier); and the Real defined as impossible to represent, to manipulate) I.S.R.-or R.S.I., the title of one of his last emblematic seminars. They are strange letters, the first three in the name of Israel. A gratuitous speculation! We shall see! These letters were surely on his mind, for he writes in the first version of the "Proposition": "The solidarity of these three principal functions which we have just traced finds its point of intersection in the existence of the Jews-which does not surprise us, since we know the importance of their presence in the psychoanalytic movement. It is impossible to unburden oneself of the consecutive segregation of this ethnic group through Marx's considerations, through Sartre's even less so. This is why, especially why, the religion of the Jews must be questioned within our hearts (mise en question dans notre sein)". 12 This enigmatic paragraph disappears from the second version. Yet it calls for commentary. First we must consider the identification of the "point of intersection [of the] three principal functions" with "the existence of the Jews." Later, particularly in the seminar "R.S.I.," which is largely concerned with the Borromean knot, Lacan identifies the intersection of the three circles of the knot, a representation of his three categories, with the "object 'a'" the object-cause of desire but also the place and function of the psychoanalyst in the cure. For Lacan, then, the Jewish people occupy the same space as the "object 'a,'" which also explains the following phrase in the paragraph: "Which does not surprise us, since we know the importance of their presence in the psychoanalytic movement. 13 Another point on which Lacan does not vary concerns the importance which he lends to the practice of textual interpretation in the training of psychoanalysts, to the "textual knowledge" he demands of them. We find an emphatic affirmation of this in one of his central writings, "L'instance de la letter dans l'inconscient." 14 The knowledge of the psychoanalyst consists first of all in his ability to read (listen to) his patient's discourse and to read Freud's texts as well as the great works of world literature. Where then can one learn this art, this rhetoric? Lacan answers: "Here is the area in which we determine whom to admit to study. It is he from whom the sophist and the Talmudist, the peddler of stories and the bard, have drawn their strength, which at every moment we recover, more or less clumsily, for our own use" {"Proposition du 9 octobre 1967," first version}. A few years later Lacan returned at length to this brief allusion to the art of reading the Talmud, in a long interview on Belgian radio. 15 We find here an emphatic encomium of the Midrash, the art of reading which constitutes the principal intellectual activity of the Jewish people. At the extreme, psychoanalysis is assimilated to the Midrash, but a secularized Midrash, torn from its original purpose, the study of sacred texts, so that it might be applied to the discourse of ordinary analysands. 16 This leaves us with the rather emphatic last sentence of our quotation: "This is why, especially why, the religion of the Jews must be questioned within our hearts." What does this mean, this "questioning within our hearts" of the religion of the Jews? Does this expression not seem strange? Why does the "Proposition" not by the same token, invite us to "question Christians within our hearts?" It can be understood as an invitation to "de-Judaize" psychoanalysis. But the many Jews at the head of its institution had always advocated a strict secularism and affirmed antipathy for their Jewish background-an antipathy which caused many strange symptoms! Thus, when Anne Berman translated Freud's Moses and Monotheism into French, she edited out parts of the first sentence: "To deny a people of the man whom it praises as the greatest of its sons is not a deed to be undertaken light-heartedly, especially by one belonging to that people." The italicized portion of the sentence is missing from her translation. 17 Would Lacan then suppose that, although denied, the structures of the synagogue still had comparable influence at the heart of psychoanalysis? This is the logical interpretation of the first lesion of Seminar XI, Les quatre concepts fonamentaux de la psychanalyse, which immediately followed Lacan It is the correlative accession of the universalization of the subject proceeding from science, of the fundamental phenomenon whose eruption was shown by the concentration camp. {c'est l'avenement correlatif de l'universalisation du sujet procedant de la science, du phenomene fondemental don't le camp de concentration a montre l'eruption). [Proposition," first version, 22
The second version of the "Proposition" is even clearer. Lacan repeats the three famous categories here, which he also calls "facticities": the Symbolic, discussed through the Oedipal question; the Imaginary, which is also that of the psychoanalytic institution; and, finally the Real, the category which he had insistently promoted. What is the Real in our time?
The third facticity, a real one, too real, real enough that the Real is more prudish in promoting it than is language, is what makes it possible for us to speak the words concentration camp, something on which, it seems to me, our thinkers, wavering between humanism and terror, have not concentrated long enough. Suffice it to say that what we have seen emerging from it, to our horror, represents a reaction of precursors to what will go on developing as a consequence of the reshaping of social groups by science. ["Proposition," second version, 29]
